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Addressing Corruption in Military Institutions

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Military training places great emphasis on values such as integrity, and the armed forces usually hold a position of trust at the heart of the nation. However, abuses such as corruption in procurement, nepotism in officer promotion, abuse of position by general officers, infiltration by sectarian groups and use of military intelligence to smear adversaries show that the reality can be very different. In the last decade the issue has become more visible to militaries and policymakers; from scandals, social media exposure, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Corruption has also emerged as an international security issue. Military forces and Defense Ministries in many developing countries seek to limit corruption in their institutions. Incomprehension about corruption by international security assistance forces also inadvertently makes the situation worse. Based on extensive research, this paper reviews the nature of corruption in defense, describes corruption reform experiences in a range of different countries and describes how to set about such reforms. It describes several innovative approaches currently being explored by the military, international policy-makers and civil society, including approaches that quantitatively compare the corruption vulnerabilities of national militaries, and new ways to train military leadership in combatting corruption.

Keywords: Corruption, military ethics, military, change management, reducing corruption

The defense and security sectors have for decades been two of the more closed sectors of society, and there are few accounts of anti-corruption reform of militaries and ministries of defense. This is despite the many references to the relative vulnerability of the defense and security sectors to corruption, as compared with other sectors (e.g., Cockcroft, 2012; Feinstein, 2011; Githongo, 2014; Pyman, 2011).

In many countries, the defense sector has used its national security status and the umbrella of essential secrecy to deflect pressure for reform. In developing countries, donor organizations like the World Bank or the national development agencies will usually refuse to work in the defense sector: this despite evidence linking defense overspending and defense misbehavior to constraints on development.

Nonetheless, despite these inauspicious factors, there has been rapidly increasing interest in anti-corruption reform effort among military forces in many countries during the last five to ten years. There are four broad factors that have driven this change of view.

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Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/mpin.

Budget Pressure

Defense ministries and militaries have come under greater budget pressures in many countries. The waste through corruption becomes more visibly objectionable, making the subject less sensitive and easier to open up.

Visibility of the Linkage between Corruption and State Insecurity

International understanding of the drivers of insecurity and conflict has increased dramatically since about 2009 (Chayes, 2015). In particular, the U.S. State Department has recognised the central role that endemic corruption plays in fostering instability and conflict. Here, for example, is Secretary of State John Kerry at Davos in January 2015:

The fact is there is nothing—absolutely nothing—more destructive to any citizen than the belief that the system is rigged against them and that people in positions of power are—to use a diplomatic term of art—crooks who are stealing the future of their own people. Corruption is a radicalizer because it destroys faith in legitimate authority. It opens up a vacuum, which allows the predators to move in. Corruption is an opportunity destroyer... it turns a nation's entire budget into a feeding trough for the privileged few. (Kerry, 2015)

In Kenya, John Githongo, the former permanent secretary for governance and ethics, put it well: “Corruption—systematic graft—is at the heart of the state’s inability to respond to insecurity in general” (Githongo, 2014, quoted in Ombaka, 2015, p. 13).

Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan

An additional factor for military forces that have been in operation in Iraq and Afghanistan is that they have experienced at first-hand how their mission has been subverted by corruption. This has led to many militaries overturning their historic response of “This is a matter for civilians, not the military”; instead taking steps to understand the issue and see what actions they need to take to be better prepared in future operations. This has been true, for example of the U.S. and the UK militaries, and of NATO (Pyman, Vittori, Waldron, & Seymour, 2014). The huge scale of investment in Afghanistan has, in turn, driven attention to why so much of it was wasted; the United States has invested \$119 billion (SIGAR, 2015), more than the whole of the Marshall Plan in Europe after the Second World War.

Pressure from the NGO Transparency International

Transparency International’s Defense and Security Anti-Corruption Program has worked on corruption in the sector since 2004. They produce a detailed comparison of the extent and quality of the anti-corruption preparedness of the militaries and defense ministries of 130 countries. This index receives wide publicity and has stimulated reform action from some seventy ministries of defense (Transparency International UK, 2015).

But increasing interest does not necessarily translate into success at the national level against defense and security corruption. There is widespread lack of knowledge about which reforms have been tried, with what effect, and less knowledge still about how to go about developing a strategy for reducing corruption in defense and security.

The purpose of this article is therefore to explore what approaches to corruption reform have been working in a range of countries, what factors are important, and how the common elements of the reforms can be developed into a strategy that other countries can utilize.

The article is structured in three parts:

- An overview of defense corruption
- Recent reform actions in the militaries and defense ministries of ten countries: five countries at peace (Bulgaria, Georgia, Norway, Poland, South Korea) and five countries with insurgencies or significant instability (Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Mali, Ukraine)
- Proposing a defense reform strategy, based on the learning from the reforms in the ten countries

In all the above, the Transparency International “Government Index” metric is frequently referred to as a benchmark. This metric is serving three purposes: (a) it serves as a basis for comparing the anti-corruption preparedness of one country’s defense sector to another; (b) it serves as a baseline, so the country and others can see if the measures taken have had an overall impact or not; (c) at the more granular level, it is used as a guide to which corruption risks are the most in need of attention.

PART 1: CORRUPTION IN DEFENSE

Despite a simple definition—“Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 2016)—*corruption* is a deceptive word. Most people feel that they understand the word, but it easily gets away from you when you seek to get into detail, because there are so many different specific sorts of corruption. It becomes absolutely fundamental to be able to say: “Here, these are the specific types of corruption” at a sufficient level of detail and granularity to be able to get right inside the subject together.

Such granularity is specific to sectors and needs to be analyzed on a sector-by-sector basis. In defense, a typology of the specific corruption issues that are relevant to the military and defense organizations was first developed in 2012. The typology shows twenty-nine specific risks, as shown in Figure 1. The risks cover a wide range: from political issues like the infiltration of the defense ministry by organised crime, through issues like nepotism in recruitment and promotion, to more technical risks like single-source procurement, or corruption via private security companies. This defense typology has now been stable for several years (Transparency International UK, 2015).

These risks are shown in Figure 1, organised into five categories: political corruption issues, financial corruption issues, personnel corruption issues, operational issues, and procurement issues.

In 2013, an index of country vulnerability to defense corruption was first published, based on these twenty-nine risks (Transparency International UK, 2015; Transparency International UK Defense, & Security Program, 2015a). This index is predominantly a technical one, not one based on perceptions. For example, it asks about the actual percentage of the defense budget that is secret, about the level of theft in the disposal of military assets, about the percentage

29 DEFENSE CORRUPTION RISKS		
POLITICAL	PERSONNEL	PROCUREMENT
Defense and Security Policy 10	Leadership Behaviour 4	Technical Requirements / Specifications 7
Defense Budgets 7	Payroll, Promotions, Appointments, Rewards 5	Single Sourcing 2
Nexus of Defense & National Assets 1	Conscription 2	Agents / Brokers 1
Organised Crime 2	Salary Chain 2	Collusive Bidders 1
Control of Intelligence Services 2	Values & Standards 4	Financing Packages 1
Export Controls 1	Small Bribes 1	Offsets 3
FINANCE	OPERATIONS	Contract Award, Delivery 3
Asset Disposals 2	Disregard of Corruption in Country 2	Subcontractors 1
Secret Budgets 6	Corruption within Mission 1	Seller Influence 1
Military-owned businesses 2	Contracts 1	
Illegal Private Enterprises 1	Private Security Companies 1	

FIGURE 1 Specific defense corruption risks. *Note:* The numbers in black boxes refer to the number of technical questions that address that risk. *Source:* Transparency International UK.

of noncompetitive defense procurement. A total of seventy-seven questions are asked in relation to the twenty-nine risks. Results are available for all areas of the world, with the aggregated result for each country shown on a scale from A, the best prepared, to F, the least prepared.

Figure 2 shows, for example, the results across the Middle East and North Africa. None of these countries scores highly (Transparency International UK Defense, & Security Program,




FIGURE 2 Middle East and North Africa: Country defense corruption vulnerability. *Source:* Transparency International UK.



FIGURE 3 NATO and NATO partners: Country defense corruption vulnerability. *Source:* Transparency International UK.

2015b), with all of them having aggregated results in bands E (orange) or F (red), meaning their militaries have a high, or very high, vulnerability to corruption.

Results from the same defense index are shown in Figure 3 for NATO countries, for NATO partner countries, and for G20 countries (Transparency International UK Defense and Security Program, 2015c). Here the scores are, on average, higher, with two countries achieving the top aggregated result of A (Australia and the UK).

The results for each country are also available as a detailed report, typically 50–70 pages, detailing the score for each of the questions and the evidence that supports the score assigned.

The analysis allows for more detailed comparison. For example, looking at the disaggregated results for the North African countries, those areas where a country's military is most and least vulnerable are evident. For example, Egypt: what can be seen in Figure 4 is that their integrity score in personnel—the red bar—is high.

That means that salaries are public, they are paid on time, they do not have ghost soldiers, their promotion system is more or less meritocratic. On the other hand, Egypt scores very poorly in the other four areas of defense corruption risk (political, finance, operations, procurement).

The results are also used by nations as the basis for specific improvement plans. For example, in Lebanon, the military has taken this analysis seriously and is seeking to improve risk by risk, so as to take action to maintain the army's integrity, in an otherwise very weak government environment, as best as possible.

PART 2: RECENT DEFENSE REFORM IN TEN COUNTRIES

Whilst militaries and defense ministries are often reluctant to share details of their anti-corruption reforms, the amount of information available is steadily increasing as countries are more active against corruption and are more open about their progress.




FIGURE 4 North Africa: Country defense integrity score by risk category. *Source:* Transparency International UK.

These countries were chosen because they have all embarked on significant defense anti-corruption reform. Whilst some have had considerable success, others have not succeeded, and the reason why not has been explored here. Other countries are also undertaking reform, but the size of this article precludes the opportunity to review them also. The chosen examples cover five countries at peace and five countries that have significant insurgencies or national instability. It is in such environments that the connection between corruption and state instability is most evident and most critical.

COUNTRIES AT PEACE

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian government of 2009–2013, led by the centre-right GERB party, was strongly focused on anti-corruption. Bulgaria had just had some of its EU funding cut off due to lack of progress on tackling corruption. The focus was especially strong in the defense ministry, whose senior leadership had already developed an anti-corruption strategy in 2008, ready to implement in 2009 were they to be elected. The successes and failures of the initiative have been described in some detail by the former Bulgarian deputy defense minister (Tzvetkova & Pyman, 2013).

Besides large-scale staff changes, the new leadership made the following changes:

- Immediately established an anti-corruption council in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as the key leadership change body.
- Introduced transparency into the decision-making process as a basic weapon against hidden practices related to abuse of position-in-office for personal gain.
- Developed the strategic documents of the defense policy and the modernization of the armed forces under the condition of clear accountability to the citizens regarding the ways of spending the defense budget.

- Put into law that any contract over €50 million should be approved by the parliament.
- Developed an Ethical Code of Conduct for military and civilian personnel.
- Introduced specialized training in anti-corruption practices.
- Implemented rules on preventing and determining conflicts of interest.
- Changed the internal rules on publication entirely, because everything was confidential or secret and nothing was published on the MOD website.
- Changed the rules for so-called “special procurement” for secret tenders.
- Created a strategy for the management of surplus property and published on the webpage the complete list of MOD and military real estate.

Positive evidence of the impact of these changes was found in the relatively good scoring of Bulgaria—in band C—in the Transparency International Government Defense index in 2013 and 2015 (Transparency International UK Defense and Security Program, 2015d), although no earlier comparative evidence is available.

Georgia

The anti-corruption reforms in Georgia are well known (World Bank, 2012). The MOD and the military have equally played their part in these reforms. Nonetheless, the assessment in the Government Defense Index of Georgia in 2013 was quite poor, in band D.

Perhaps surprised by the poor result, the MOD was very energetic in responding to the poor results. They dissected the answers to all seventy-seven questions in detail, took just those where they scored poorly, and used the model answers to these questions as the basis of an improvement action plan (Ministry of National Defense, Georgia, 2013). They followed that up with leadership days, senior officer anti-corruption training, and secondments by senior officers, who then took over the training at the National Military Academy in Tbilisi.

The new Georgian MOD leadership had committed to maintaining the reform momentum. There is a strong indication of improvement from the 2015 Government Defense Index (GI) result, in which Georgia scored in band C, significantly improved from the 2013 score of band D–. The policy lesson is that the combination of leadership determination with sector-specific tools that can quantify the extent and quality of corruption prevention measures represents a huge leap forward in anti-corruption potential.

Norway

Despite its status as one of the “cleanest” countries, Norway has been humble in its approach to defense corruption. Norwegian society expects high standards from its government, and there have been several cases of Norwegian contractors being too close to their MOD, and of dubious sales of second-hand assets to third-party countries. As a result, the MOD has set up very strict rules for the ways that contractors can work with the MOD. They have been active supporters of the NATO “Building Integrity” initiative (NATO, 1985), they were one of the first countries to put themselves through the NATO Integrity Self-Assessment Process, and they have recently established a dedicated agency, the Centre for Integrity in the Defense Sector (<http://cids.no>).




FIGURE 5 Poland: Leading defense corruption risk areas identified by the MOD. *Source:* Transparency International UK.

Poland

Poland had a government-wide anti-corruption initiative in the period 2006–2010, and again in 2011–2014 (http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ftp/filmy/Raport_2011_wangielska.pdf; <http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/wydawnictwa-cba/publikacje-w-jezyku-ang>; https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report_en). The early initiative was particularly strong in the Ministry of National Defense, where the defense minister provided strong political direction for reform. They identified eight weak areas, ranging from procurement to conscription; see Figure 5. To follow up, they then set up a full-time task force, one that included civil society personnel, and whittled the eight priority areas down to just three: high-value procurement, high-ranking officers, and abuse of power.

The key to its success was the presence of the full-time task force. It comprised only four staff, but they were committed, and clearly had the support of the minister. The staff was largely brought in from outside the ministry, and the team was headed by a man who had previously been a civil society activist.

Between 2005 and 2013, Poland moved from being the most corrupt nation in the EU in 2005, as measured by the Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), to one in the middle, ranking fifteenth of twenty-eight. Their defense sector ranking improved from band D– in 2006 (their own self-assessment) to band C in 2013 and then band B in 2016 (Transparency International defense rankings).

The principal policy lesson was the importance of putting in place a full-time implementation team. In Poland this started out with the modest title of Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau. It is now quite well established, with a rather grander title: Office of the Minister’s Plenipotentiary

for Anti-Corruption Procedures. It does not have to be large—Poland’s is only four people, and it was a good move to staff it with outsiders. The team has been a permanent feature of the ministry for almost ten years.

COUNTRIES WITH INSURGENCIES OR SIGNIFICANT INSTABILITY

Burundi

The international community has been working with Burundi on a large Security Sector Reform program (SSR) since 2008, led by the Netherlands (<http://www.ssresourcecentre.org/countries/burundi>). Whilst the program has made considerable progress, the country has remained unstable, and 2015 saw a resurgence of violence and conflict, triggered by the decision of the president to seek a third term in office. Despite the problems, efforts have been made to make progress with both military and police anti-corruption efforts, such as facilitating leadership days and assisting with developing anti-corruption action plans with both (Pyman, Cover, Vidal, Kerr, & Fish, 2014a, 2014b).

A positive element of the reform program was that both the Ministry of Good Governance and the Security Reform Program were ready to include anti-corruption in their programs. This is unusual: most SSR programs fight shy of addressing corruption, on the grounds that it is too sensitive, or on the basis that good-governance measures will in time reduce corruption without the need for any more specific action.

The Ministry of Good Governance took some ground-breaking actions to make the defense and security budgets more transparent than they had ever been in the past. Figure 6 shows the annual budgets of the army, police, and various ministerial departments (blue bars), and contrasts this information with the number of budget headings and amount of budget detail available (red and green bars). The chart shows how the police and the army can have huge budgets but reveal very little. What is astonishing is that this chart is available on the basis of public data—there are dozens of countries in a similar situation, but the comparable detail is not available or is secret.

Burundi offers one policy lesson for governance evolution: Where there is significant insecurity, the whole security sector needs to be brought within the fold of good-governance efforts. Not to do so would make a mockery of the reform program.

Colombia

Colombia has made major efforts against corruption for the last 10–15 years, with mixed success. The Defense Ministry has been a part of those efforts, recognising that the wars against FARC and the narco-traffickers would never be won for so long as the military are engaged—or are perceived as being engaged—with either group, or with corruption. The military has implemented a whole string of measures; including an Ethics and Transparency Commission, a single logistics agency across the three military services, initiatives to legitimise the army in society’s eyes, and a strong Internal Control Office.

The secretary general of the defense ministry instituted one of the cleverest institutional reforms to tackle corruption due to excessive secrecy in defense procurement. Previously,

CORRUPTION FUELLING INSECURITY: BURUNDI OPACITY OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET




FIGURE 6 Burundi: Extent of publicly available detail of the National Budget. *Source:* Transparency International UK.

almost all procurements had been secret. Of itself this is not a corrupt act, but the bureaucratic convenience that goes with not having to tender, or to be public about who wins contracts, quickly leads to corruption. The secretary general decided that henceforth all contracts would be public; unless she personally signed to say that one needed to be secret for reasons of state security. An official could thus still get permission for a contract to be secret and/or not tendered. But it would now be a career-limiting move to argue that an order for, say, 4-wheel-drive vehicles had to be secret, when this was patently not a matter of state security. Within a year or two, the culture had changed substantially, with public tendering becoming more the norm and no longer the exception (Narvaez, 2015).

Colombia is another country where the military now have a high positive level of public trust. This is an opportunity for further country improvement, but also is necessary. A military of 300,000 is large enough to dominate governance and integrity issues for the worse as well as for the better.

Colombia scores highly in the 2013 Transparency International Government Defense Index, in band C. In line with this, the defense inspector general declared at a NATO conference in February 2015 that after ten years of defense corruption being a top problem for the Colombian military, corruption had now been sufficiently reduced that it was no longer one of the top three concerns.

Policy Lessons

Power often sits in specific organizational structures, which have to be changed before other, softer reforms can have an impact. In the Colombian MOD, big anti-corruption changes were impossible until the power of the individual military chiefs (Army, Navy, Air Force) had been

cut back. This took several years and several senior careers. On the other hand, Colombia showed that clever use of administrative rules—as opposed to law—can dramatically change culture, like the example of the authority level required for making a procurement process secret.

Mali

Mali offers an object lesson for countries providing “security assistance” (Boas & Torheim, 2013; Coulibaly, 2014). Mali received significant security training support from the United States and the French between 2001 and 2011, when the coup attempt happened. A recent study (MacLachlan, 2015) interviewed the U.S. trainers, the French trainers, the Malian military, and Malian civilians. The finding was that the international trainers were no match for those in the Malian military wishing to divert—and indeed subvert—the assistance, and use it to support the 2012 coup. Mali received U.S. and French defense assistance between 2001 and 2011. As can be seen from the two quotations below, people on the ground knew full well the weakness of the Malian army, whilst those providing the assistance, despite good intentions, were absolutely not focused on the corruption threat.

The weakness of the Malian army ... came as little surprise to anyone who had been watching the steady erosion of state institutions, largely as a result of widespread corruption. (Lebovich, quoted in MacLachlan, 2015)

“We were so focused on the small unit tactical stuff and by the time we started to shift the focus to the institutions the coup occurred”—Senior U.S. military officer, 2015. (MacLachlan, 2015, p. 32)

Ukraine

In Ukraine, corruption is not pathology or some sort of deviant behaviour from the normal: Ukrainian politics and governance have been largely set up as a successful mechanism for extracting money and power to the benefit of a small elite (e.g., Sakwa, 2015). The issue of corruption is thus not just a marginal nuisance problem for the military—it is absolutely at the heart of state insecurity and incapacity, and all solutions have to start from this understanding.

One young conscript illustrates the problem. He is a 32-year-old Ukrainian who worked for the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv (Lapko, 2014). He received his call-up papers in 2015 at the time that he was on secondment to Transparency International to learn in depth about anti-corruption measures. He immediately faced a dilemma. He could either pay \$2,500 to get a false medical certificate saying that he was unfit to fight. Or he could pay \$2,500 to buy a functioning AK-47, body armour, night sights and a first aid kit. He needed to do this because all the money for such equipment had been stolen by the Ukrainian military hierarchy, so conscripts had to buy their own. His conclusion: “Corruption can be just as deadly as bullets.”

Since 2008, the Defense Ministry has been experimenting with anti-corruption reforms. After the EuroMaidan protests in Kiev in 2014, the willingness to reform has risen exponentially. Some significant changes have taken place.

- Civil society volunteers have been brought into key senior MOD positions (e.g., as head of the tender board). This is a very radical move; which seems to be going well.

- The MOD has set up an anti-corruption training academy (BITEC), training over 1,000 colonels.
- The MOD has trained many auditors in anti-corruption.
- The MOD has recently finalised an ambitious and wide-ranging anti-corruption plan.
- The defense minister has dismissed many senior generals.
- Taking senior military secondees for intensive anti-corruption experience and research in London, providing input on possible anti-corruption actions in an environment of low political will, and supervising research on Ukrainian MOD corruption by the Ukrainian secondees (Barynina & Pyman, 2012).

The principal policy lesson from Ukraine is how to make progress when there is no political will for reform, as was the case here from 2008 to 2014. The Ukrainian security and defense leaders were smart: they had a highly developed sense of what reforms they could implement without making their political masters nervous, and which others would get them fired, or in deeper danger. Their chosen tools were mass training—training is very low-profile politically—leadership days, and secondments.

PART 3: DEVELOPING A DEFENSE REFORM STRATEGY

All the above countries, and many others, are having a measure of success. How might other countries go about learning from these experiences? Based on the experiences in these ten countries, and on the experience of implementing Transparency International's proposed reforms in a range of other countries as well (Transparency International, 2015), the experiences can be summarised into the following guidance:

- Military leadership personnel are driven by both personal incentives and patriotic incentives. Personal incentives include personal pride in the military, the desire to see a better military for their children, and, of course, personal ambition. Patriotic incentives are also strong in the defense sector—the desire for better operational performance to safeguard the lives of their soldiers, or to safeguard the nation against external foes. These incentives also mean that individuals and leadership teams will continue to support reforms even when they are complicit in corruption.
- Putting in place a full-time counter-corruption implementation team is critical.
- It is hard, internal work that has to be done to change the key processes (e.g., defense acquisition policy decision-making, technical requirement specifications, promotion-approval boards, conflict of interest actions), and the key people, in order to see effective reduction in corruption.
- There is a large tactical/strategic element of the choice of anti-corruption approach to be taken. This includes the political factors of having to maintain reforms over a significant period (e.g., over two electoral cycles), and of the different tactics required for situations when there is strong political will, and when the political will is weak.
- Large-scale, substantive corruption-prevention training for the mid to senior levels is an essential pre-cursor, so as to build a new mental model of corruption among the top and middle military leadership.
- Quantitative monitoring of the anti-corruption plan is very powerful.

- Leading an anti-corruption initiative is a lonely endeavour. Creating a support community internationally is necessary and very helpful.

These experiences also almost all have in common that the changes rarely happened through putting new institutions or new laws in place. Leading organizational behaviour change and instilling new behaviours needs rigorous attention as a process in its own right.

In this final part of the article, five approaches are discussed that can help when setting about large-scale defense corruption reform:

- Shaping a common leadership view of corruption in defense;
- Gaining collective leadership support for change;
- Building sector-specific anti-corruption expertise;
- Having a single-sector focus, such as on defense; and
- Emphasising counter-corruption for military forces on operations.

Shaping a Common Leadership View of Corruption

The leadership in defense ministries is often unsighted on how to tackle corruption in their ministry and military. Comments such as the one below are regularly voiced:

Yes, we do indeed have a serious corruption issue in our ministry/military/security force. And, in all honesty, we don't really know how to get the corruption out of the system, or even where to start.

In a similar vein, most senior officers and officials have a very simple view of corruption that follows the following format:

I know corruption is a crime; I know I am involved in it, as are my colleagues; I know it is a hard and difficult process to eradicate it; I know I am vulnerable to accusations of it. Therefore, I will not talk about it and will not raise it in any meeting.

Thus there is usually no discussion of the subject at the leadership level—it is never on the leadership agenda. There is little or no awareness of the importance of prevention as the key tool against corruption. There is no expectation that there could be a common leadership initiative against corruption. There is no hope that progress can be made.

One positive approach is therefore to accept the prevalence of this mental model, and to use particular mechanisms that would bring this mind-set to the surface and lead to the development of a constructive solution to it. The mechanism is to use a facilitated, open-format leadership day, in which a large proportion of the Defense Ministry and military leadership take a whole day to discuss the nature of the corruption issues that they face, and possible ways in which they can be tackled. Once the leadership team has determined that it is politically safe to talk about this subject, then they do so with clarity and perceptiveness.

In the case of Ukraine, the leadership was very clear on what were the principal anti-corruption priorities in 2015: to tackle corruption in personnel promotion and recruitment, and corruption in the provision of war supplies to the fighting in the east. Other countries have been similarly specific. For example, senior military and Defense Ministry officials from Botswana prioritised corrupt control of the military and civilian intelligence functions as their

top corruption risk; a risk that has been significant in Latin American countries and currently is common in many West African countries.

Such prioritization of the corruption risks is important—it forms the basis of an action plan centred around whichever of the principal risks can be tackled; one that will have the support of the leadership, because they have shared in the analysis of the risks. Whilst such a leadership day does carry political risk for the principal sponsor, the very unusualness of the event offers the opportunity of a significant step forward in understanding, and the potential political benefits of being seen to take the lead across government in tackling corruption.

Gaining Collective Leadership Commitment to Change

One positive approach is based on identifying those incentives that will encourage officials inside a corrupt system to change their behaviour. One such incentive is personal pride; officers are taught a lot about personal integrity in their training, and they cleave to this even after many years working within a corrupt system. Another incentive is to be upholding the ideals of military leadership; this is a very particular issue in the case of the military, as it means leading “their” men into battle and to possible death. A third incentive is maintaining the place of the military—and themselves—in their society: many military and security officers see themselves as one of the core elements of their society, and deeply regret the loss of respect that comes with increased corruption. Senior defense ministry officials and top military officers may thus support a lot of change, even if they themselves are part of a corrupt system.

Allied with such readiness to accept change is the acknowledgement—indeed relief—that they are not experts, or even amateurs, in tackling embedded corruption. Military forces are highly tuned organizations—they can plan campaigns, they can operate highly complex, dangerous equipment, they can move hundreds of thousands of soldiers and vast amounts of equipment. But they are not trained to squeeze corruption out of their systems. This illustrates a fundamental point: Changing large organizations is a skill in its own right. Public administration/policy schools and business schools and the management literature are overflowing with guidance on how to lead change, demonstrating that it is not yet a skill that has been articulated or codified. The management world would scoff at the anti-corruption movement’s touching faith in implementing individual technical initiatives without addressing how to lead the organizational behavioural change needed to adapt to the new technical agencies.

Building Centres of Sector-Specific Anti-Corruption Expertise

The need for full-time defense counter-corruption groups in all defense ministries is one of the universal lessons from all countries. This needs resources and expertise, and therefore specialist training. There are now five centres worldwide for strengthening defense integrity: one in Norway’s MOD, one at the UK Defense Academy, one at the National Defense University of Ukraine in Kiev, one at NATO HQ in Brussels, plus the one at the Transparency International defense program.

Having a Single-Sector Focus

Counter-corruption work has in the past been a cross-government activity. This is for good reasons—because corruption crosses all organizational boundaries. But it has a major disadvantage, in that such a broad approach can disenfranchise the professionals in each individual sector. On the other hand, the single-sector approach means that those working in the sector recognise that the initiative is aimed specifically at them; this is highly motivating. The single-sector focus means that the ministry and the military teams in the country develop a level of real competence in anti-corruption in the sector: sufficient to lead new knowledge gathering, to mentor senior officers and officials, and to have the credibility to compare country capabilities at a technical level.

Counter-Corruption for Military Forces on Operations

Coming back closer to home, forces have started to introduce corruption scenarios into their exercises. NATO, for example, has started to introduce corruption elements into its scenarios, as, for example, in the ARRCADÉ FUSION exercises in 2013 and 2014.

Sitting behind such a scenario are the beginnings of guidance on how military commanders might need to reshape their force structures in order to be better prepared for a highly corrupt environment.

A handbook entitled *Corruption Threats and International Missions* (Pyman, Vittori, Waldron, & Seymour, 2014) brings together all the current knowledge on how commanders should prepare themselves and their brigades. It has been well-reviewed in military academies (Sullivan, 2015), and is currently the only written guidance on how to prepare for operations in a highly corrupt environment.

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