

BACKGROUND PAPERS | REFORM EXPERIENCE

ANTI-CORRUPTION TRAINING COURSE* IN KABUL FOR AFGHAN MOD AND MOI SENIOR OFFICERS

A review of participants' opinions 18 months later



* The course is organised by NATO's 'Building Integrity' programme, in collaboration with Transparency International UK.

Transparency International (TI) is the civil society organisation leading the global fight against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption, and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it. For more information about TI, please visit www.transparency.org.

The Defence and Security Programme works with governments, defence companies, multilateral organisations and civil society to build integrity and reduce corruption in defence establishments worldwide. The London-based Defence and Security Programme is led by Transparency International UK (TI-UK). Information on Transparency International's work in the defence and security sector to date, including background, overviews of current and past projects, and publications, is available at the TI-UK Defence and Security Programme's website: www.ti-defence.org.

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SUMMARY

Transparency International UK (TI) has been leading a Defence and Security Programme (DSP) since 2004, working with governments, defence companies, civil society and international organisations to reduce corruption in defence establishments and to strengthen the integrity of defence institutions and Armed Forces.

A key tool in achieving this is an education course that teaches officers and defence officials how corruption can be tackled and prevented. TI-DSP developed a five-day course tailored to this audience and objective in 2008 and 2009, in collaboration with NATO's 'Building Integrity' (BI) initiative. The course builds up knowledge on the concept of corruption, how it manifests itself in the defence and security sector, how it can be prevented and how to build institutional integrity. It also builds confidence among participants that such an objective is worthwhile and achievable. A key delivery objective of the BI course is to make sure that lessons are practical for the audience so that they can apply what they have learned in their workplace.

In February 2011, NATO and TI-DSP delivered two back-to-back courses for the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (Mol). TI-DSP cooperated with faculty at the American University of Afghanistan to interview in detail 31 alumni — both defence and police—of the 40 who did the course in February 2011.

The feedback shows that, overall, the course is highly relevant to Afghan participants and it demonstrated a tangible impact by allowing many alumni to think in new ways about corruption and improve their own work. The main findings are as follows:

- **Two-thirds of alumni said the course still had a positive impact on their work;**
- **Almost all alumni discussed the course with colleagues, and almost all would like to teach or develop the course in the future;**
- **More guidance can be given to course participants on writing 'How Will I Tackle It Forms' (HWITIFs);**
- **A significant amount of alumni cited leadership or institutional problems blocking them from integrating integrity and anti-corruption work.**

In other national applications, the BI course is part of a larger programme that includes in-country mentoring and opportunities for secondment placements to TI-DSP's office in order to achieve improved sustainability. Continuing such a model in Afghanistan is highly advisable in order to achieve greater impact.

1. INTRODUCTION

Transparency International UK's Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) has, as its mission, the reduction of corruption in all areas related to the military, defence and security activities. This is a serious topic: defence is a sector that is crucial to a country's security, and corruption in it is dangerous, divisive and wasteful. It puts international security at risk, it can lead to regional arms races to satisfy the greed of intermediaries, and billions can be wasted in dishonest arms deals.

Nonetheless, through our work with defence ministries and armed forces it quickly became obvious that the military does want to engage on the subject of building integrity and reducing corruption risks. Many defence officials and officers recognised that corruption in this sector was detrimental to their performance, and to the legitimacy citizens entrusted them with.

Moreover, the topic of ethics resonates with most military personnel: it is something most of them have been educated in from their basic training onward. Countering corruption risks in defence therefore made sense in the context of training and education, and found keen interest from many when the possibility was first raised. Furthermore, deployed peacekeeping/peacemaking forces—especially in conflict zones—often find themselves engaged in a high corruption environment and possibly are seen as complicit in that corruption. Understanding the effect and the potential remedial measures is often not well understood by military personnel and the officials engaged in their deployment and support. This is particularly relevant to operations in Afghanistan and also to some UN missions.

TI-DSP has been involved in training military officers and officials since 2008. We established collaboration with NATO in 2007, and this developed into NATO's 'Building Integrity' (BI) programme—a programme to counter corruption risks in defence. The programme aims at strengthening defence institutions in NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries through a number of different initiatives. Key amongst these is a five-day training course on "Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk", for which TI-DSP was the prime developer and remains jointly responsible for the curriculum. Between 2008 and 2011, the course was run some five to six times a year, in six countries, and was attended by over 600 participants from 27 nations.

Defence is a sector that is crucial to a country's security, and corruption in it is dangerous, divisive and wasteful. It puts international security at risk, it can lead to regional arms races to satisfy the greed of intermediaries, and billions can be wasted in dishonest arms deals.

The BI course has been run 6 times in Afghanistan since 2009. As a credit to local ownership and relevance of the course, it was Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials who requested the course be run in Afghanistan after attending the course in Ankara, Turkey. The Ministry of Interior (Mol) quickly requested to be included in the training programme. Since 2009 roughly 200 Afghans have taken part in the BI course.

2. COURSE OVERVIEW

The 'Building Integrity' foundation course aims to strengthen the grounds for leadership, integrity, good governance and change management in countering corruption risk within the defence and security sector. It is a one-week education course for senior officers and defence officials. We developed it in collaboration with NATO and partner organisations such as the United Kingdom Defence Academy (UKDA), the NATO School Oberammergau, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the Swedish National Defence Academy.

It is aimed at the next generation of senior defence leaders, full Colonels and above (although many Generals have attended the course), senior defence ministry officials and those with a role in the middle of the hierarchy in effecting change. To give participants as much knowledge on defence corruption risks and how to counter them, the course design follows three guiding principles:

- to make the course participatory and interactive;

- to focus on building strong systems and giving participants tools to contribute to them;
- to focus on changing attitudes and building confidence that defence corruption is an issue that can be addressed and tackled.

We place emphasis on open communication, practical advice and experience sharing and building relationships between participants, staff and speakers. Individual contributions to the course are encouraged, and discussion groups, case studies and guest speakers are a widely employed mechanism for sharing knowledge. This approach fosters a cross-cultural examination of the topic of corruption and integrity building in the defence sphere, and advances awareness and understanding of experiences and best practice in implementing concrete preventive counter corruption mechanisms in nations. An overview of the course content, which can be adapted to each context, is shown below.

FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE OF A 5-DAY ANTI-CORRUPTION COURSE





FIGURE 2: BUILDING INTEGRITY (BI) COURSE INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS



The February 2011 course consisted of two back-to-back courses for the Afghan MoD and MoI. Both courses were the standard 5-day course. However, due to scheduling arrangements, the MoI course was delivered in 3 extended days.

2.1 COURSE PARTICIPANTS

Split into two roughly even groups, 40 participants took part in the course over the two weeks. They included a human rights civil society representative and a civil servant from the Civil Service Institute. MoD and MoI participants ranged from mid-level office staff to the heads and deputy heads of departments. The MoD staff were almost all colonels, plus 3 generals and a brigadier general. The MoI audience were colonels and lieutenant colonels.

Thirty-one of the 40 course alumni were interviewed for this survey. This included 16 MoI, 13 MoD, 1 Civil Service Institute, and 1 member of civil society (Fig 2). Their ranks included 27 Colonels, 2 Majors, and 1 Teacher Rank 3, and 1 Education Officer (Fig 4). Finally of the Afghan ethnic groups represented, the respondents included 17 Tajiks, 10 Pushtuns, 2 Sadaats, and 2 Hazaras (Fig 3).

To assess the impact of the course, alumni are interviewed to see:

- how the course changed their perception of corruption;
- if they are using the material from the course;
- if they have achieved any of the goals that they set from the HWITIFs;
- how they have interacted with colleagues and external partners on anti-corruption;
- if they have been promoted based at all on attending the course.

In addition to impact, alumni are also asked if they would want to teach or develop a course of this kind in the future, and what they would recommend to improve the course.

Finally, the opportunity is also taken to ask alumni for their views of corruption in Afghanistan; what is the level, the challenges, and what can be done.

The interviews were all done on the phone, in Dari or Pashtu, and typically lasted 1 hour.

FIGURE 3: ETHNICITY OF COURSE ALUMNI





FIGURE 4: RANKS OF COURSE ALUMNI



3. INTERVIEWS AND FINDINGS

3.1 PERSONAL IMPACT

After a year and a half since taking part in the BI course, the majority of participants (two-thirds) expressed that the course had a positive impact. Sixteen alumni, 50 per cent of overall respondents, said the course helped them improve their daily work, and 10 specifically said the course improved their ability to plan, budget, and conduct evaluations. Three alumni involved in training said they added a BI course to their curriculum or integrated aspects of BI into their own courses.

An official from the Office of the General Chiefs of Staff said: *“In order to improve integrity in my organisation, I have run trainings for finance department of chief [of] staff. I have taught them what I learned in the BI course”*. The greatest level of impact was the course’s ability to inspire one senior participant to write a book on leadership which he hopes will be useful for police and government staff.

Despite these positive results, a small sample of respondents gave reserved or negative opinions about the impact of the course. The most reserved statement acknowledged the delayed effect of any impact: *“The important point is that these courses don’t have immediate impacts. It takes time to see the impacts”*. The civil society member was cautious about NATO delivering the course as he believed people are mistrustful of the organisation. Two participants said the course would not achieve any impact due to leadership or those who are already corrupt not listening.

In terms of the course’s ability to change perceptions on corruption, once again two-thirds said that it had, mostly saying they gained new knowledge. Five participants said their knowledge stayed the same, but that the course reconfirmed beliefs. Only two alumni felt the course did not change perceptions based on the course not providing anything new, or not believing that the course’s recommendations are enforceable.

One respondent whose perception was changed was still pessimistic about impact. He stated:

“Yes, the BI changed my idea about corruption, but unfortunately we are not allowed to bring major changes, and we have to follow all the current procedures, which are outdated. If we have suggestions for improving our work, our superior officials do not attend to our suggestions, which makes us disappointed and disinterested.”

FIGURE 6: CHANGES IN PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AMONGST ALUMNI





FIGURE 5: ALUMNI OPINION OF COURSE IMPACT



3.2 “HOW WILL I TACKLE IT?”

Part of keeping the course practical and relevant to participant’s work is the use of How Will I Tackle It Forms (HWITIFs). When they fill out their HWITIFs, course participants are encouraged to think about practical actions they will take to implement what they have learned.

Just over half of the participants (18) from this course did not use their HWITIFs very well; essentially saying that they would perform their jobs with integrity without providing concrete actions. Two additional respondents said corruption in Afghanistan needs to be addressed in general.

Finally, one senior defence staff described the ramifications of his zero-tolerance stance to corruption:

“I have faced challenges as well. Since I am tough and do not tolerate corruption, there are many people in our brigade who have become my enemy. They have tried many times through their contacts at the ministry to dismiss me from my job.”

“Now I am at a point that I want to quit my job. I went to military school and served for many years during Najibullah’s regime. I learned honesty and integrity at that time since corruption was minimal at that point. I cannot stand the corruption in this regime.”

I prefer to get retired with integrity rather than work in a corrupt environment.”

Thirteen of the course participants did describe some type of specific action. Four alumni said they planned on passing on what they had learned. Four additional course participants were more specific, planning to integrate BI into trainings. This included one staff each from Mol, MoD, the Civil Service Institute, and civil society. Two more participants said they planned on producing documents on BI.

One senior defence staff wrote a detailed plan of his report on how to apply BI to his work environment:

“Writing a complete report and explaining about the course of honesty and rectitude for my office.”

- *Arranging a good plan and use of what I’ve learnt from this course for teaching my subordinates and*
- *Informing them about the importance of honesty and loyalty in the current defensive institution.*
- *Applying an assessment to see how to manage the lessons had been thought.*
- *Presenting particular suggestions in order to find new ways and mechanisms for sustaining the honesty and rectitude in defensive institutions. And to see how we can improve and expedite this process. “*

Finally, two respondents proposed quite detailed ideas. The civil service teacher wanted to set up coordination mechanisms between various departments, implement training, and make guidance materials available. A senior Mol staff wanted to set up reward mechanisms for staff demonstrating good conduct, hold internal anti-corruption campaigns, and conduct more seminars:

"If I have the responsibility to manage my own office, I will give the responsibilities to whoever is qualified and promote the level of transparency among the staff and also will follow and control their tasks whether it's being done correctly or not.

"I will clarify the cause of corruption among the employees and will consider giving material and spiritual presents to those who have good achievements in their fight against corruption. Recognising and reminding the components and base of corruption among government organizations to the staff, I will setup big charts in different areas of our working environment like corridors and work rooms and will advertise clearly the penalties related to corruption crimes.

In order to eliminate the corruption from government organisations, I suggest my own solutions to the related office and as an auditor will consign the offenders to the law. I will use what I learnt in this seminar in my job and honesty and integrity will be my slogan in my job. Finally, in order to prompt fighting against [the] destructive phenomenon of corruption, I suggest such useful and effective seminars for different level of police forces and also directorates."

In contrast to the proposal for reward mechanisms, only one alumnus (from the MoD) specifically mentioned punishing individuals for corruption and taking offenders to the police.

As over half of the participants were not very specific in what actions they would take, 20 of the interviewees believed they achieved the goals of their HWITIFs. The author of the leadership book glowed that his achievements had been recognised and highlighted by the Minister of Interior.

Only four of those who would do more than just perform their job with integrity believed they achieved their goals, and four others who wrote detailed HWITIFs were measured and said they performed some of their goals.

"I will use what I learnt in this seminar in my job and honesty and integrity will be my slogan. Finally, in order to prompt fighting against [the] destructive phenomenon of corruption, I suggest such useful and effective seminars for different level of police forces and also directorates"

An Mol official noted that he faced an obstacle when trying to investigate corruption in insecure areas of the country, while two others said their obstacles were internal procedures and no follow-up from superiors. A mid-level officer from the MoD outlined his frustrations as follows:

"I asked from the head investigation directorate of MOD to provide a condition that I could teach the BI course for the Afghan National Army (ANA) staff because I thought it will contribute to transparency in the Ministry. However, I think officers like us do not have enough power to fight corruption.

“The challenge is that some military rules and procedures were enacted about 50 years ago and these rules and procedures can create huge problems for now. But we cannot do much and have to follow these procedures and rules.

“Unfortunately corruption has become part of our culture and there is no commitment for fighting corruption. Corruption is no longer seen as bad in the society as it used to be in the past.”

Even some people who achieved their goals still cited the challenges of superiors officials with one saying *“People who have useful ideas usually are not heard”*.

In contrast to that statement, when highlighting achievements they undertook in addition to their HWITI Forms, one alumni said he managed to implement a course with the support of his superiors. An additional respondent also implemented a course, while another arranged meeting groups for his subordinates to be able to discuss issues of BI.

Interestingly, in citing reasons for success in addressing corruption and building integrity, 11 of the participants (4 MoD and 7 Mol) noted that

they had not faced very many, or any, incidences of corruption or that they worked in corruption free environments.

3.3 DISCUSSING WITH COLLEAGUES AND WITH OTHER ORGANISATIONS

Twenty-nine interviewees responded to the question of discussing the course with colleagues, with all of them saying their fellow staff were supportive or reacted positively. However, most of this positive reaction came from colleagues of an equal rank or subordinates. Four respondents (2 MoD and 2 Mol) added caution in their answers noting that they could not discuss the course with superiors because that is where corruption was entrenched. An MoD alumni noted his reservations as follows:

“Those of my colleagues who are corrupt think that we are backward and naïve when we talk about honesty and integrity. Those individuals who are honest sympathise and support us when we talk about fighting corruption and promoting honesty in our work place.”



Participants discussing for an assignment in one of our Building Integrity courses in Kabul, Afghanistan. Credit: Transparency International's Defence and Security Programme

An additional alumni explained discussions with colleagues:

“Reaction of my colleagues to what I have learned in the BI course has been positive. However, they sometimes ask me how one could be honest in a system in which most of the people are corrupt. I believe that the people have lost their trust and hope in elimination of corruption in Afghanistan. I have even seen some people who respect the regulation even for copying 1 page [of] paper. But most people are not so optimistic.”

In terms of external partnerships, almost all of the alumni said they had not worked with any independent anti-corruption organisations, with the majority who followed up saying they were too busy in their jobs to make such outreach. Two defence staff and the civil servant specifically said they are not allowed to conduct such outreach, believing that since they are state employees, they are not allowed by law to work with civil society organisations (CSOs) or independent organisations.

Three respondents said that while they had not contacted any external partners, they would like to, but did not know who to contact. An MoI staff member felt it is in fact government officials’ duty to work with independent anti-corruption bodies. Finally, three alumni did connect with anti-corruption bodies, but one was a civil society member himself and interacted with other CSOs regularly. An MoI staff member did not work with any Afghan organisations, but rather attended workshops from international actors. Finally one senior MoD staff reached out to an Afghan organisation, the Independent Committee of Anti-Corruption.

Of the almost two-thirds of respondents who were not promoted, a few noted there was no room for promotion, with some others saying they are in the same position for a number of years. However, three MoI personnel specifically cited corruption—in the form of bribes or relations—as standing in the way of promotions.

3.4 PROMOTION


Attending the BI course had a reasonable impact on promotions for alumni. Three MoD and 3 MoI alumni received promotions, all of whom said attending the BI course had a positive impact. Additionally, an MoD member of staff changed positions laterally while another received a special assignment inspecting prisons. Both alumni gave direct credit to their participation in the BI course.

Of the almost two-thirds of respondents who were not promoted, a few noted there was no room for promotion, with some others saying they are in the same position for a number of years. However, three MoI personnel specifically cited corruption—in the form of bribes or relations—as standing in the way of promotions. One respondent said: *“the reason is that I don’t have any money and someone to help me get a promotion. To get promoted you need either money or know someone in the ministry”*. It is unfortunate that he did not state he would not pay a bribe to get promoted.

3.5 FOLLOW UP

Almost all alumni said that they want to teach and/or develop a BI course in the future. Only one person said he would only develop the course and seven said they would only want to teach. Four alumni said they would not want to teach or develop courses, with three citing time pressure, and one citing health.

There were a number of suggestions on ways the course could be improved (Fig 4). Almost half the respondents wanted the course to be longer. In addition to 8 MoI participants, 6 MoD members of staff and the civil servant also wanted a longer course. There were a few excessive suggestions of making the course 2-weeks long or even a month. The next most significant suggestion, from 7 people, was to integrate teachings from Islam into the course. As one person said, *“As you [know] that we are Muslim and it is good to describe corruption based on Holy Quran verses and the narrations from the Prophet.”*



4. BI COURSE GOOD PRACTICE

4.1 COURSE DELIVERY

There are 3 key unique elements in the delivery of the BI course that help make it work for participants:

1) Practical

2) Dialogue

3) Experience

The course does not dwell on theoretical frameworks and policy. To help keep all the participants on the same track—and because corruption can be a broad subject—definitions and concepts are discussed in the beginning. These definitions and concepts are also brought up in a **practical** context to allow participants to quickly learn how to recognise and use them. As the course goes on, exercises, scenarios, and discussions are often used so that participants can own concepts and eventually carry them into the work place. This has been evidenced by alumni feedback.

Dialogue is important not just in the classroom, but in the entire week. The course is not only about education delivered in modules, it is about the social interactions during the whole week. This allows participants to build up trust to talk about a subject that is often taboo. Our experience has been that course attendees are reluctant to talk about corruption in their country or will even go into denial during the first day's modules. However, after the first night's social gathering, conversations naturally start flowing as friends are made and trust is built. It does not take that long for this subject—which is normally steered clear from in the military—to be discussed openly. Furthermore, as this report's survey evidence shows, the topic is

even discussed outside of the course.

Finally, having trainers with experience is important for building trust, providing technical knowledge, and having empathy with course participants. The fact that most of the training team comes from the defence or security sector helps create credibility with course participants. These members will also be able to discuss specific technical elements of the course such as procurement, codes of conduct, or combat operations. Furthermore, the training team may not know all the same corruption problems as training participants, but will be able to empathise with participant challenges. This helps in delivering the course and making it relatable.

4.2 COURSE INTEGRATION INTO A LARGER BI PROGRAMME

In other national applications, the BI course is part of a larger programme that includes in-country mentoring and opportunities for secondment placements to TI-DSP's office in order to achieve improved sustainability in reforms. Continuing such a model in Afghanistan is highly advisable in order to achieve greater impact on addressing corruption.

An example of successfully integrating the BI course into a larger programme is Ukraine. TI-DSP has worked with the UK MoD for the past five years in the broader context of the BI Programme, conducting 4 trainings in the country. In addition, 7 staff from the MoD, National Security Service, and the National Defence University have taken up positions as secondments in TI-DSP's office for up to 3 months at a time. While they are with us, they learn more “hands on” approaches to address corruption, improve their language skills, teach

TI-DSP staff about their own country, and often conduct major pieces of research.

One of the most successful examples of this is the report “The 3rd Line of Defence: How audits can help address defence corruption”, which is based on an analysis of Ukrainian audit reports.

In between training and secondment opportunities, TI-DSP has cooperated with the UK Defence Attaché in Ukraine to monitor and advise alumni, ensuring up to date contact. TI-DSP advisors also routinely visit Ukraine 3 to 4 times a year, to also check in with alumni and work with the UK Defence Attaché on planning alumni gatherings, and help them set up their own programmes.

This programme has proven to be a success in creating the foundations for improved anti-corruption measures in Ukrainian defence and security agencies. Alumni are now integrating their own BI courses and modules into their training programmes, and even establishing more auditor positions within the MoD.

4.3 COURSE FOLLOW-UP AND MONITORING

The Ukrainian example and this report demonstrate that the BI courses cannot simply end once the course is done. We have begun integrating regular post-course reviews such as this report to find out what impact the course content has on alumni once they return to their work place, how they have achieved success, and what challenges they face.

Follow up is also important to help advise alumni and even to let them know that they are being listened to. The fight against corruption can be an isolated affair, and it helps to let alumni know someone is listening, and also potentially connect them to other alumni to create local networks.

Background papers | Reform experience

**“The 3rd line of defence” :
How audits help address
defence corruption**

The experience of Ukraine

www.ti-defence.org
www.transparency.org.uk

Report written by Maryna Barynina, one of our secondees from Ukraine. She analysed Ukrainian audit reports and the role they can have in uncovering corruption.

5. CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Alumni provided a range of comments on corruption in Afghanistan. Feedback differed on the current levels of corruption, how it was working, and who or what could be responsible for making corruption worse or better (Fig 5). While only 3 members of the Mol specifically said they thought corruption has increased (the time scale of the increase was not specified), the majority of comments were negative, recognising that corruption existed at a significant level. One Mol and MoD member of staff felt that corruption had decreased in recent years, and a senior Mol staff said corruption is actually not so bad.

As to the causes of corruption, one-third of respondents said the country's leadership is a problem, but also possibly the only form of solution to corruption: *"The only remaining opportunity would exist if all high-ranking officials and our leadership take the fight against corruption seriously"*.

Other statements specified the problem on leadership, notably on nepotism and ethnic loyalties, and problems of impunity. One Mol staff who linked all three issues said:

"Corruption is widely spread throughout the country, and it is increasing day by day. The state has passed many laws for fighting corruption but without any results. That is why people don't trust [the] government organisations. We have lots of opportunities for decreasing corruption through punishment of corrupt officials and rewarding honest ones. However, these opportunities are missed since appointments are based on relations rather than based on merits, so no one cares about punishing the corruption officials. All the reforms should start from the top of the

government and the most senior officials."

Six alumni—4 Tajick, 1 Pushtoon, and 1 Hazara—said nepotism or ethnic loyalty are a key issue. A Tajick alumni described the situation as follows:


"The challenge is the highly divided nature of our government along language, ethnicity, and party lines. Unfortunately these affiliations are more important than qualifications and merits even in our army. All these problems originate from our leadership and the highest levels of our government since the subordinates follow their superiors."

Three respondents cited weak institutions or impunity as a key problem in corruption. In describing frustration with weak institutions, an Mol staff member questioned the authenticity of special courts:

"Unfortunately, for some people corruption is a golden gate for prosperity and luxurious lifestyle. And no one is interested in fighting corruption. What is the reason for establishing a special court for prosecuting corrupt ministers? Why all other courts can't ask or investigate the cases of corruption involving ministers? That is because there is no political will to prosecute these corrupt ministers, and [it comes as] no surprise that none of them has been prosecuted yet."

Salaries and poverty were the next most cited cause of corruption by five people. An Mol staff, while not necessarily condoning corrupt officials, sympathised with government staff based on their low pay stating: *"Their expenses are more than their income. For instance, a civil servant may be*

FIGURE 7: ALUMNI SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES TO BI COURSE



paid 5000 Afs per month while his family expenses could be more than 15000 Afs”.

Three respondents highlighted the media as a useful tool to help fight corruption. One said: “The opportunities that we have right now in Afghanistan include the increased flow of information and free media. They can help us in revealing and addressing problems caused by corruption”. Another person agreed that more information—particularly on successful convictions—would be useful: “I believe that mass media could play a major role in reducing corruption while Afghans

lack information about punishment of those who are corrupt and prosecuted”.

In addition to this link between the media and prosecutions, an MoD alumni emphasised the power of public knowledge of corruption convictions: “We have corruption in our country, and in the last few months even some ministers are under investigation for corruption. These investigations have great impact on our people, and it plays an alarm to the people who are corrupt”.

An additional response emphasising punishment noted the need for a greater rule of law: *“The solution for our entire problem is only rule of law, and increasing the punishment of violators and encouraging honest officials”*.

There was a split view on whether the role of foreigners was positive or negative. Three Mol staff felt the international community had a positive impact, and three alumni—2 Mol and 1 MoD—said they had a negative one. One answer was

pragmatic, citing both roles that foreigners could play:

“Corruption is widespread in our country since the high-level officials are corrupt. The world community could contribute to fighting corruption in Afghanistan through monitoring. Nevertheless, we should not forget that some of the internationals are corrupt as well. If the price of one sack of rice is around 10 AFs, the contracts are given for \$10 per sack.”

One optimistic interviewee combined the role of international actors and treaties:

“But fortunately we have not missed all of [the] opportunities for fighting corruption. The opportunities come with the international treaties which Afghanistan has made with other countries. They have promised to support Afghanistan if the government take[s] the fight against corruption seriously. I think if the international community wants [to], it can put pressure on the government to fight corruption.”

Another respondent noted the negative impact which foreign influence has on Afghan leaders’ sense of responsibility: *“Corruption in Afghanistan is caused by few people at the highest level of the government. Unfortunately all of our expenses are now provided by foreign countries, so our*

politicians do not feel responsible toward the people”.

Two additional people said that corruption was imported, but they were not clear on who was responsible.

Acceptance of corruption was cited by three respondents, and was also mentioned in other interview questions. As a Mol member of staff said: *“Corruption has changed the culture in our country. People are not ashamed of engaging in corrupt activities”*.

6. CONCLUSION

This survey of two of the anti-corruption courses shows the BI course has a good impact on training participants. The main findings from the survey are as follows:

- Two-thirds of alumni said the course had a positive impact on their work: Fifty per cent of respondents integrated knowledge or tools from the course into their work. This is a great credit to the value of the BI course. This suggests its content is practical and relevant. Further, training participants understand how to apply what they have learned in their own context.
- Almost all alumni discussed the course with colleagues, and almost all alumni would like to teach or develop the course in the future: This demonstrates a great appetite for learning about anti-corruption amongst Afghans and a desire to own the topic.
- More guidance can be given to course participants on writing HWITIF: While there were some well thought out HWITIFs, providing some more guidance can potentially increase the impact of the course even further.

- A significant amount of alumni cited leadership or institutional problems blocking them from integrating integrity and anti-corruption work: This issue was raised in a previous training impact study, specifically by Afghans.¹ As leadership is cited as one of the main problems for tackling corruption in Afghanistan overall, future courses will likely benefit from the addition of change management modules. This will help training participants think of how they can keep working on anti-corruption in the immediate term and also plan for long term change.

In other national applications, the anti-corruption course is part of a larger programme that includes in-country mentoring and opportunities for secondment placements to TI-DSP's office in order to achieve improved sustainability. Continuing such a model in Afghanistan is highly advisable in order to achieve greater impact.

¹ Transparency International's Defence and Security Programme, *Training the military and defence and security officials in understanding and preventing corruption*, 2013.

Other reports from the Defence and Security Programme:

Defence Offsets: Addressing the Risks of Corruption and Raising Transparency (2010)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/153-defence-offsets--addressing-the-risks-of-corruption-&-raising-transparency>

Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence and Security: 20 Practical Reforms (2011)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/88-building-integrity-and-reducing-corruption-in-defence-and-security--20-practical-reforms>

[Also available in Russian and Ukrainian]

Codes of Conduct in Defence Ministries and Armed Forces (2011)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/90-codes-of-conduct-in-defence-ministries-and-armed-forces>

[Also available in Arabic]

A Review of Anti-Corruption Reform Measures in the Defence Sector in Colombia (2011)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/102-a-review-of-anti-corruption-reform-measures-in-the-defence-sector-in-colombia>

Organised Crime, Corruption, and the Vulnerability of the Defence and Security Forces (2011)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/858-organised-crime,-corruption,-and-the-vulnerability-of-defence-and-security-forces>

The Transparency of Defence Budgets (2011)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/893-the-transparency-of-defence-budgets>

Counter Corruption Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries (2011)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/907-counter-corruption-reforms-in-post-conflict-countries>

Military-Owned Businesses: Corruption and Risk Reform (2012)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/997-military-owned-businesses--corruption-and-risk-reform>

Due Diligence and Corruption Risk in Defence Industry Offsets Programmes (2012)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/1019-due-diligence-and-corruption-risk-in-defence-industry-offsets-programmes>

The 3rd Line of Defence: How Audits Can Help Address Defence Corruption (2012)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/1121-the-3rd-line-of-defence--how-audits-can-help-address-defence-corruption>

Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index (2012)

<http://companies.defenceindex.org/report>

Arresting Corruption in the Police (2012)

<http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/1431-arresting-corruption-in-the-police>

Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index (2013)

<http://government.defenceindex.org/report>

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